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Abstract We can recognize thousands of individual objects
in scores of familiar settings, and yet we see most of them
only through occasional glances that are quickly forgotten.
How do we come to recognize any of these objects? Here,
we show that when objects are presented intermittently for
durations of single fixations, the originally fleeting memo-
ries become gradually stabilized, such that, after just eight
separated fixations, recognition memory after half an hour is
as good as during an immediate memory test. However, with
still shorter presentation durations, memories take more
exposures to stabilize. Our results thus suggest that repeated
glances suffice to remember the objects of our environment.
Keywords Memory: Long-term memory · Memory:
Visual working and short-term memory
Introduction
We are not only able to identify tens of thousands of objects,
from cups to cruisers, but we are also able to remember
particular instances of such objects, such as the cup that is
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on my desk. The objects that populate the many environ-
ments we are familiar with seem to be learned effortlessly,
can be recognized after incidental exposure (e.g., Castel-
hano & Henderson, 2005), and yet most may have received
no more than an occasional glance. When objects are shown
for the duration of a single fixation (about 250 ms; see e.g.,
Rayner, 1998) or less, those objects are readily processed
(e.g., Li, VanRullen, Koch, & Perona, 2002; Potter, 1975),
but the resulting memories are fleeting, decaying after a
few seconds and disappearing almost completely after a
few minutes (e.g., Endress & Potter, 2012; Intraub, 1980;
Potter, Staub, Rado, & O’Connor, 2002; Potter, Staub, &
O’Connor, 2004). Yet, the same objects are remembered in
detail when looked at for 3 s (e.g., Brady, Konkle, Alvarez,
& Oliva, 2008).
How do we transform the fleeting memories result-
ing from single fixations into stable long-term memories?
While observers sometimes fixate objects multiple times
(e.g., Castelhano, Mack, & Henderson, 2009), they still have
to integrate those glimpses into stable LTM representations.
Moreover, the time during which an object is projected onto
our retina is clearly not the only determinant of the stability
or even existence of the resulting memory.
For example, observers famously fail to notice a gorilla
in full view when they are attending to other aspects of
a display (Drew, Vo˜, & Wolfe, 2013; Simons & Chabris,
1999) and, at least in statistical learning tasks, observers
do not appear to learn anything about those items they do
not attend to (Toro, Sinnett, & Soto-Faraco, 2005; Turk-
Browne, Junge´, & Scholl, 2005). Conversely, even very
brief presentations can yield relatively good memory when
viewers attend to them and continue to think about them.
For example, presenting pictures for just 110 ms followed
by a blank screen for 5,890 ms yields comparable memory
2414 Atten Percept Psychophys (2014) 76:2413–2423
to a full 6-s presentation, at least after a retention interval of
a few minutes (Intraub, 1980).
If fleeting memories need to be consolidated into more
stable ones, there is a second complication, reflected in the
long and ongoing history of controversy about the rela-
tion between short-term memory (STM) and LTM. The
modal model of memory developed in the 1960s held that
LTM representations need to be consolidated from STM
(Atkinson & Shiffrin, 1968). In contrast, subsequent evi-
dence suggested dissociations between STM and LTM:
patients like HM could not form new LTM representations
despite relatively spared STM (Scoville & Milner, 1957),
and patients like KF could form novel LTM representations
despite impaired (verbal) STM (Shallice & Warrington,
1970), leading to the view that STM and LTM might be
independent and dissociable (e.g., Baddeley, 2001; Brady,
Brady, Konkle, & Alvarez, 2011; Cowan, 2008; Luck, 2007;
Sternberg, 2009; see also Craik & Lockhart, 1972, for a
compilation of differences between long-term memory and
short-term memory).
In fact, there would be an important design reason for a
dedicated STM system that is independent of LTM: speed
of access. For example, even with memory sets as small as
4–16 items, there is a noticeable delay in accessing mem-
ory items that increases with the size of the memory set
(Wolfe, 2012). Given the large capacity of LTM (Brady et
al., 2008) (that might, in the case of the mental lexicon,
comprise more than 50,000 words; see e.g., Pinker, 1999),
it is easy to see how access to LTM might be too slow for
manipulating mental representations. However, if LTM and
STM are indeed independent, it is unclear how we can come
to recognize the objects that populate our environments, as
we should not be able to transform the fleeting memories
resulting from glimpses into stable LTM representations.
While the dominant view is arguably that STM and LTM
are independent and dissociable, other authors have pro-
posed STM and LTM to form a continuum (e.g., Crowder,
1993; Greene, 1986; Wickelgren, 1973; Nairne, 2002; see
Ranganath, 2005, for a recent review).
Here, we thus ask whether (and how readily) repeated
but intermittent exposure to objects for durations of single
fixations transforms fleeting STM representations into more
stable LTM representations. It is well established since the
onset of experimental psychology (Ebbinghaus, 1885/1913)
that once an item is in LTM, repeated exposure increases
its memory strength and delays its forgetting. It is not clear,
however, whether, and how readily, fleeting STM represen-
tations would lead to stable LTM representations. In fact,
there are reasons to think that brief intermittent exposure
might not lead to stable LTM representations. For example,
Subramaniam, Biederman, and Madigan (2000) presented
participants with rapid sequences of line drawings of objects
for a duration of 72 or 126 ms per picture. Prior to each
sequence, participants were given an object name and were
instructed to report after the sequence whether that object
had appeared in the sequence. Importantly, the items in the
sequences were repeated, such that participants had (briefly)
seen each picture between 0 and 31 times as nontargets,
before that object was used as a target. Subramaniam et
al. (2000) found no evidence that detection performance
improved as a function of how often the targets had been
briefly seen before. Yet when target images were pre-
sented for 5 s at the beginning of the experiment (arguably
sufficient for LTM), detection performance improved.1
At first sight, these results seem to suggest another disso-
ciation between LTM and STM: Repeated exposure clearly
improves LTM retention (Ebbinghaus, 1885/1913), while
Subramaniam et al.’s (2000) results seem to suggest that this
might not be the case for STM. However, in the latter study,
participants were actively searching for a target, which, in
turn, might have limited how much they remembered of the
items, just as observers can fail to remember having viewed
a gorilla when they were busy attending to other aspects
of a display. Perhaps if participants were simply viewing
items without a search task, memory would improve with
repetition.
In fact, there are other reasons to think that STM might
be consolidated across views. For example, Pertzov, Avi-
dan, and Zohary (2009) presented participants with an array
of objects, and measured short-term retention of the objects
as a function of how often they had been fixated. Results
showed that objects were remembered better when they had
been fixated more often. However, while these results sug-
gest that, within STM, memory can be strengthened by
multiple views, they leave open the question of whether
such strengthening would occur over longer retention inter-
vals as well. Likewise, Melcher (2001) found that memory
for objects improved if participants were shown a scene con-
taining many objects repeatedly for 0.25, 1, or 2 s, and if
they had to recall objects from the scene after each presen-
tation. He proposed that the memory was an intermediate
form of memory, between STM and LTM (see also Melcher
& Kowler, 2001; Melcher, 2006). However, these results
leave open the question of whether memory consolidation
would also occur with the shortest presentation durations
if the presentations were not followed by a recall period;
1In a different condition, Subramaniam et al. (2000) showed that prim-
ing occurred even with a 72-ms presentation, provided that the prime
was designated as the target on that trial and was followed by a 3-s
interval before the sequence began. However, and as mentioned above,
Intraub (1980) showed that presenting an item for 110 ms followed by
a 5,890-ms blank screen yields comparable memory performance to
presenting the item for 6,000 ms. In line with these results, we thus
propose that the priming Subramaniam et al. (2000) observed under
these conditions might not have been due to the brief presentation per
se, but rather to the time available to process the stimuli during the
presentation and the following blank interval.
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after all, this period gives participants additional processing
time even after the retinal image had disappeared, and it is
well known that repeated recall leads to improved memory
even when the memory items are presented only once (e.g.,
Erdelyi & Becker, 1974).
Here, we investigate directly whether repeated brief
exposure to objects can transform fleeting STM representa-
tions into more stable LTM representations. Experiment 1
comprised two parts. In each trial of the first part, partic-
ipants were presented with a sequence of 12 pictures of
everyday objects for a duration of 250 ms per picture. A test
picture followed: participants had to decide whether it had
been part of the sequence. Importantly, most pictures were
shown only once throughout the experiment, but a subset
appeared in 1, 2, 4, 8, or 16 trials, with repetitions separated
by three to seven other trials (each with 12 pictures), equiv-
alent to an average delay of about 50 s. The repeated items
were never used as test items in the first part.
In the second part of the experiment, we tested partici-
pants’ LTM for these repeated pictures (including the subset
that was presented only once and not repeated). Exper-
iment 2 was similar to experiment 1, except that items
were repeated only for up to eight times, and that we also
tested the effect of the retention interval between the last
presentation of an item and the later LTM test.
To foreshadow our results, experiments 1 and 2 revealed
better long-term retention when items were repeated more
often. In experiment 3, we tested two critical issues arising
from these results. First, other studies using shorter presen-
tation durations did not find memory consolidation; we thus
asked whether items presented more briefly would yield a
memory benefit, and whether this benefit was reduced com-
pared to longer presentation durations. Second, we asked
whether long-term memory retention was simply a function
of the total presentation time.
Finally, in experiment 4, we compared the behavior with
pictorial stimuli from experiments 1 to 3 to that with verbal
stimuli, for two important reasons. First, there is substantial
evidence that (short-term) memory for verbal items is inde-
pendent of other forms of memory (e.g., Baddeley, 1996,
2003; Endress & Potter, 2012). Further, while repeatedly
recalling pictorial stimuli improves recall performance for
the memory items, this does not seem to be the case for
words (e.g., Erdelyi & Becker, 1974). Hence, it is possi-
ble that words would behave differently from pictures in the
experiments outlined above. Second, and crucially, the prob-
lem participants faced in experiment 4 is different from that
in experiments 1 to 3. In experiments 1 to 3, participants
had to construct novel LTM representations, and to decide
later on whether or not they had ever seen the test items.
In experiment 4, in contrast, participants had pre-existing
LTM representations for the words they were presented with
(otherwise they would have been non-words). Hence, during
the LTM test, participants had to distinguish between words
they knew and saw during the experiment, and words they
knew but had not seen during the experiment. As a result,
it is possible that this latter task might be somewhat more
difficult than that in experiments 1 to 3.
General methods
Participants
We recruited 48 participants (nine, eight, and eight females
in experiments 1 to 3, mean age 24.2) from the MIT com-
munity, sequentially assigned to experiments 1 to 3. An
additional 18 participants (11 females, mean age 22.2) were
recruited for experiment 4; we retained only the first 16 for
analysis to keep the number of participants constant across
experiments.
Apparatus
Stimuli were presented on a NEC MultiSync FE700+ 17”
CRT (refresh rate: 75 Hz; resolution: 640 × 480), using
the Matlab psychophysics toolbox (Version 3.0.8; Brainard,
1997; Pelli, 1997). Responses were collected from pre-
marked “Yes” and “No” keys on the keyboard.
Materials
Stimuli in experiments 1 to 3 were color photographs of
familiar everyday objects taken from Brady et al. (2008).
Stimuli were randomly selected for each participant from
a set of 2,400 pictures. They were presented subtending a
visual angle of 12.7 × 12.7 degrees.
Stimuli in experiment 4 were words. We selected 2,381
nouns from the CELEX database (a frequency database for
English words) with the constraints that each noun (i) had
between four and ten letters; (ii) had one or two syllables;
(iii) had a minimum frequency of 100 of out 17.9 million
words; (iv) was unique in the final list (e.g., words that dif-
fered only in plural markers were removed); (v) was not
specific to British English; (vi) was not a proper noun; (vii)
was not a swear word or otherwise offensive. Words were
presented in a font size of 22 in Courier lowercase font.
Experiment 1
Methods
In the first part of the experiment, participants started each
trial by a key-press; after a fixation cross, 12 pictures were
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presented for a duration of 250 ms per picture. 1.5 s after the
sequence the test picture was presented for 800 ms. “Old”
test items (those that occurred in the sample sequence) were
randomly sampled from two initial, two final and two mid-
dle positions, excluding the first and last pictures. “New”
test items were presented on 50 % of the trials.
There were 50 critical pictures that were presented in 1,
2, 4, 8, or 16 trials each (hereafter called the “repeated pic-
tures” even though ten were presented only once). None
of the repeated pictures were tested immediately after the
sequence, and participants were not informed that pictures
would be repeated or that there would be a later memory test
of some of the items. There was a total of 132 trials. Tri-
als were organized into five start trials, 30 end trials, and 97
central trials. The repeated pictures were presented only in
the central trials. Picture repetitions were separated by five
intervening trials on average (minimum: three; maximum
seven), corresponding on average to a delay of about 50 s.
Serial position in the sequence was counterbalanced within
each number of repetitions; the repeated pictures were never
in the first or last serial position.
In the second part of experiment 1, participants were
tested on their memory of the repeated pictures. They were
shown all 50 repeated pictures (10 items × 5 numbers of
repetitions) mixed with 50 novel pictures, presented one at
a time. For each picture, participants indicated whether or
not they had seen it before in the experiment. We uncon-
founded the number of repetitions and the memory delay by
controlling the last appearance of the memory items during
the first phase of the experiment. In the first phase, the last
presentation of all critical items was within a range of six
trials. As a result, the delay between the last presentation of
a given picture and when it was tested in the second phase
was unrelated to the number of repetitions.
Results and discussion
In the immediate memory test of the first part of experi-
ment 1, participants performed well above chance (M =
75.8 %, SD = 4.9 %; Fig. 1), t (15) = 21.2, p < .0001,
Cohen’s d = 5.3. Using the two-high threshold formula for
estimating memory capacity (e.g., Cowan, 2001; Rouder et
al., 2008), this performance corresponds to a capacity of 6.2.
In the LTM test in the second part, participants were not
above chance when the picture had been presented only
once (M = 54.1 %; SD = 9.0 %; Fig. 1 and Table 1), sug-
gesting that a single fixation is rarely sufficient to establish
a stable long-term memory.
However, when the critical items were repeated, long-
term retention improved such that, after eight repetitions,
participants’ LTM performance was equivalent to that in the
immediate tests in the first part, and after 16 repetitions,
LTM performance exceeded performance on the immediate
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Fig. 1 Results of experiment 1. The dotted line shows the average
percentage of correct responses during the first part of experiment 1
with an immediate test. The shaded region around it represents the
associated SEM. The solid line shows the percentage of correct
responses in the second part of experiment 1 as a function of the
number of repetitions. Error bars represent SEM
memory test (see Table 1). The LTM results were analyzed
using a logistic mixed-effects model with the number of rep-
etitions as a linear predictor. We observed an effect of the
number of repetitions, β = .085, Z = 7.6, p < .0001,
suggesting that LTM retention improved when items were
repeated more often.
Experiment 2
Method
In experiment 2, we investigated the temporal stability of
newly created LTM representations. experiment 2 was sim-
ilar to experiment 1, with two exceptions. First, due to the
limited set of available pictures, items were repeated only up
to eight times. Second, and crucially, we included a manipu-
lation of the retention delay. Specifically, as in experiment 1,
the first part of experiment 2 measured short-term reten-
tion of the items. This part included 156 trials that were
organized into five start trials, four end trials, and three cen-
tral blocks of 49 trials each. Each central block contained
40 critical pictures that were presented in one, two, four,
or eight trials each, and whose long-term retention would
be tested in the second part. Constraints on the number of
intervening trials between repetitions of a picture as well as
on the serial positions of the repeated pictures were as in
experiment 1.
The central blocks were used to manipulate the retention
interval by inverting the order of appearance of the blocks
between parts 1 and 2. Specifically, in part 2, long-term
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Table 1 Percentage of correct responses and associated t tests as a function of the number of repetitions in the second part of each experiment
and of block (Experiments 2 and 4 only; block 3 corresponds to the shortest retention delay while block 1 corresponds to the longest one)
Block # Repet. M SD Against chance level of 50 % Against 1st part performance
t(15) p Cohen’s d t(15) p Cohen’s d
Experiment 1 (second part)
– 1 54.1 9.0 1.8 .091 .45 10.4 <.0001 2.6
– 2 57.5 8.8 3.4 .0038 .86 6.6 <.0001 1.7
– 4 70.9 12.3 6.8 <.0001 1.7 1.5 .155 .4
– 8 75.9 9.3 11.1 <.0001 2.8 .1 .941 .02
– 16 80.3 10.4 11.6 <.0001 2.9 2.3 .038 .57
Experiment 2 (second part)
3 1 55.6 11.2 2.0 .064 .5 7.2 <.0001 1.8
3 2 61.9 14.4 3.3 .005 .83 4.3 .0007 1.1
3 4 67.2 15.2 4.5 .0004 1.1 2.3 .035 .58
3 8 73.4 13.3 7.1 <.0001 1.8 .6 .543 .16
2 1 56.6 9.6 2.7 .016 .68 7.3 <.0001 1.8
2 2 57.5 9.5 3.2 .006 .79 6.5 .0001 1.6
2 4 65.0 15.8 3.8 .002 .95 3.1 .008 .76
2 8 72.8 11.5 7.9 <.0001 2.0 .8 .415 .21
1 1 54.1 12.0 1.3 .196 .34 7.0 <.0001 1.7
1 2 52.8 8.6 1.3 .208 .33 9.9 <.0001 2.5
1 4 61.2 12.0 3.7 .002 .93 4.0 .001 1.0
1 8 70.9 10.2 8.2 <.0001 2.1 1.8 .088 .46
Experiment 3 (second part)
– 1 49.4 6.8 .4 .718 .10 9.6 <.0001 2.4
– 3 55.6 8.3 2.7 .017 .67 4.4 .0005 1.1
– 6 54.7 10.7 1.8 .101 .44 4.7 .0003 1.2
– 12 60.9 10.4 4.2 .0007 1.1 2.5 .025 .62
– 24 61.6 13.1 3.5 .003 .88 2.1 .053 .53
Experiment 4 (second part)
3 1 53.75 11.0 1.36 0.194 0.34 5.8 <.0001 1.5
3 2 54.69 12.3 1.52 0.149 0.38 6.18 <.0001 1.5
3 4 55 10.5 1.91 0.076 0.48 6.41 <.0001 1.6
3 8 63.44 13.7 3.91 0.001 0.98 4.02 0.001 1.0
2 1 55 10.6 1.88 0.08 0.47 6.94 <.0001 1.7
2 2 53.12 5.7 2.18 0.0457 0.54 7.11 <.0001 1.8
2 4 53.12 10.5 1.19 0.251 0.3 7.28 <.0001 1.8
2 8 53.44 10 1.38 0.187 0.35 6.12 <.0001 1.5
1 1 53.44 9.6 1.43 0.173 0.36 7.04 <.0001 1.8
1 2 52.5 13.2 0.76 0.459 0.19 5.77 <.0001 1.4
1 4 56.56 12.9 2.04 0.06 0.51 4.35 0.0006 1.1
1 8 59.06 12.9 2.8 0.01 0.7 4.74 0.0003 1.2
The first t test is evaluated against the chance level of 50 %. The second t test is a paired t test comparing the performance in the first part to the
performance in the second part for the different blocks and numbers of repetitions
retention was tested first for items from block 3, and last for
items from block 1. As a result, the retention interval was
longest for items from block 1 and shortest for items from
block 3, making the variable presentation-block an approxi-
mation of the retention interval. The average delay between
the most recent presentation and the test was 3 min 50 s
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(SE = 11 s) for block 3, 16 min 19 s (SE = 1 min 6 s)
for block 2, and 29 min 55 s (SE = 2 min 54 s) for block
1. The blocks were presented in a continuous sequence of
trials, without breaks.
The second part of experiment 2 comprised 240 test
pictures (120 repeated pictures, 120 novel foils).
Results
In the immediate memory test in the first part of exper-
iment 2, participants again performed well above chance
(M = 75.3 %, SD = 7.3 %; Fig. 2), t = 13.8, p < .0001,
Cohen’s d = 3.5. Using the two-high threshold formula for
estimating memory capacity (e.g., Cowan, 2001; Rouder et
al., 2008), this performance corresponds to a capacity of 6.1.
In the LTM test in the second part, participants performed
at or close to chance when the picture had been presented
only once (M = 55.6 %, SD = 11.2 %; Fig. 2 and Table 1),
suggesting again that a single fixation is rarely sufficient to
establish a stable long-term memory.
However, when the critical items were repeated, long-
term retention improved such that, after eight repetitions,
participants’ LTM performance was indistinguishable from
the immediate tests in the first part (see Table 1). The LTM
results were analyzed using a logistic mixed-effects model
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Fig. 2 Results of experiment 2. The dotted line shows the average
percentage of correct responses during the first part of experiment 2
with the immediate test. The shaded region around it represents
the associated SEM. The other lines show the percentage of correct
responses in the second part of experiment 2 as a function of block
and the number of repetitions. The block number is given relative to
the first part of the experiment, and the order of blocks was inverted in
the second part. The solid line represents the performance in block 3
(average delay between the most recent presentation and the test, 3 min
50 s, SE = 11 s), the dashed line the performance in block 2 (aver-
age delay 16 min 19 s, SE = 1 min 6 s), and the dash-dotted line the
performance in block 1 (average delay 29 min 55 s, SE = 2 min 54 s).
Error bars represent SEM
with linear predictors of block and of number of repetitions
as well as their interaction. Only the two main effects con-
tributed to the model likelihood. As in experiment 1, we
observed a significant main effect of number of repetitions,
β = .11, Z = 8.5, p < .0001, suggesting again that LTM
retention improved when items were repeated more often.
Further, we observed a significant main effect of block (i.e.,
our proxy for the retention interval), β = .11, Z = 2.5,
p = .011, suggesting that LTM retention decreased with
increasing memory delay, as seen in Fig. 2b.
Discussion
The results of experiment 2 yielded two crucial results.
First, repeating items more often allows participants to
consolidate fleeting STM traces into more durable LTM
representations. When items were presented only once, vir-
tually no long-term retention was observed; when they were
presented eight times, long-term retention performance was
indistinguishable from an immediate memory test. This is
not to say that a single presentation might not yield memory
traces that might be detectable by more sensitive methods.
In fact, if the fleeting memories disappeared immediately, it
is hard to see how additional exposure could possibly help to
stabilize them. Rather, these results show that brief exposure
to an item yields memory traces that diminish in strength so
rapidly that they cannot be detected by a recognition task a
few minutes later; this temporal dynamic is arguably a qual-
ity that is usually associated with STM. Crucially, additional
exposure stabilizes these fleeting memories so that they can
be detected about half an hour later, which, in turn, is a
quality associated with LTM.
The second crucial result of experiments 1 and 2 is that
long-term retention performance declined with increased
retention intervals. This raises the question of whether the
performance decrement was due to decay or interference, or
both. In fact, interference might well play a crucial role in
long-term forgetting (e.g., Brown, Neath, & Chater, 2007;
see also Melcher & Murphy, 2011), which, in turn, does
not exclude the possibility that decay might also be a factor
in forgetting (e.g., Hollingworth, 2005). While the current
experiments do not allow us to decide whether the reduc-
tion in long-term retention after longer intervals was due
to decay, interference or both, experiments using the same
stimuli as those employed here suggest that, at least in the
short-term domain, decay might play a role. Specifically,
in Endress and Potter’s (2014) experiment 4, participants
were presented with a task similar to part 1 of experiments 1
and 2. Crucially, participants were tested either after a 1.5-s
retention interval or after a 7.5-s retention interval. Partic-
ipants performed worse after the 7.5-s delay than after the
1.5-s delay. As the only difference between the delay condi-
tions was the duration of a progress bar participants viewed
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between the end of the sample sequence and the test item,
it is plausible to attribute this difference to decay. If these
results scale up to long-term retention, one would expect a
role of memory decay in long-term retention as well, in con-
junction with interference from viewing many other images
before seeing the test images.
However, the combined results of experiments 1 and 2
raise two crucial questions. First, given that a prior study
with shorter presentation durations (Subramaniam et al.,
2000) found no priming benefit for repeated items, we asked
whether we would observe any memory consolidation with
briefer presentations. Second, we asked whether the total
viewing time would predict long-term retention, or whether
it would be modulated by the presentation duration. We thus
presented items for 133 ms each, but repeated them up to
24 times. As a result, for the largest number of repetitions,
both the total viewing time and the number of repetitions
was larger than in experiments 1 and 2.
Experiment 3
Methods
The design of experiment 3 was based on that of experi-
ment 2, except that the same items were repeated across
blocks. As a result, the critical items were presented 1,
3, 6, 12, or 24 times. Further, we included an addi-
tional 24 end trials (28 in total), so that the long-
term retention test would not start immediately after the
last presentation of the memory items. Crucially, items
were presented for 133 ms per picture rather than 250
ms.
Results
Results of experiment 3 In the immediate memory test of
the first part of experiment 3, participants performed well
above chance (M = 67.7 %, SD = 7.1 %; Fig. 3),
t (15) = 10.0, p < .0001, Cohen’s d = 2.5, CI.95 =
64.0, 71.5. Using the two-high threshold formula for esti-
mating memory capacity (e.g., Cowan, 2001; Rouder et
al., 2008), this performance corresponds to a capacity of
4.2.
In the LTM test in the second part, participants were not
above chance when the picture had been presented only
once (M = 49.4 %; SD = 6.8 %; Fig. 3 and Table 1), sug-
gesting that a single fixation is rarely sufficient to establish
a stable long-term memory.
However, when the critical items were repeated, long-
term retention gradually improved. In contrast to experi-
ments 1 and 2, however, LTM performance never reached
the level of the immediate memory test (see Table 1).
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Fig. 3 Results of experiment 3. The dotted line shows the average per-
centage of correct responses during the first part of experiment 3 with
an immediate test. The shaded region around it represents the associ-
ated SEM. The solid line shows the percentage of correct responses
in the second part of experiment 3 as a function of the number of
repetitions. Error bars represent SEM
The LTM results were analyzed using a logistic mixed-
effects model with the number of repetitions as a linear
predictor. We observed an effect of the number of repeti-
tions, β = .019, Z = 3.1, p = .002, suggesting that LTM
retention improved when items were repeated more often.
Comparison with experiment 1 We compared experiment
3 to experiment 1 for three reasons. First, both experiments
comprised only a single block of items. Second, both experi-
ments had a similar number of end trials (30 in experiment 1
vs. 28 in experiment 3), making the memory delay roughly
comparable, although it was slightly shorter in experi-
ment 3, due to both the smaller number of end trials and
to the shorter presentation duration. Third, the maximal
number of repetitions as well as the maximal total viewing
duration were greater in experiment 3 than in experiment 1.
We compared experiments 1 and 3 in two ways. First,
we compared performance on the immediate retention task.
Participants in experiment 1 (M = 75.8 %) performed bet-
ter than in experiment 3 (M = 67.7 %), t (30) = 3.73,
p = .0008, Cohen’s d = 1.32.
Second, we asked whether the speed of learning was
different across experiments 1 and 3, and whether LTM
retention differed across the experiments. The data points
we used as a proxy for long-term retention were the perfor-
mance for items repeated eight times in experiment 1 (M =
75.9 %, SD = 9.3 %), and for those repeated 24 times in
experiment 3 (M = 61.6 %, SD = 13.1 %). As a result,
the items from experiment 3 were presented both more often
than in experiment 1 (24 vs. 8 times) and for a longer total
presentation duration (3.2 s vs. 2 s). Hence, if we observe
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an impairment in long-term retention performance with
the shorter presentation duration, this impairment occurred
despite more repetitions and a longer total duration. We thus
submitted the data to an ANOVA with the between-subjects
predictor presentation duration (i.e., experiment 1 vs. 3) and
the within-subject predictor number of repetitions (i.e., 1 vs.
8 repetitions for experiment 1 and 1 vs. 24 repetitions for
experiment 3).
The analysis revealed a main effect of presentation dura-
tion, F(1, 30) = 11.2, p = .002, η2p = .271, as well as
of the number of repetitions, F(1, 30) = 73.4, p < .0001,
η2p = .671. Crucially, the two factors interacted, F(1, 30) =
5.9, p = .021, η2p = .0543.
This interaction can be interpreted in two ways. First,
separate ANOVAs for the different numbers of repetitions
(once vs. more than once) revealed no difference between
experiments 1 and 3 when items were presented only once,
F(1, 30) = 2.8, p = .107, η2p = .08, but a sizable differ-
ence when items were repeated more than once, F(1, 30) =
12.7, p = .001, η2p = .298. Hence, even though total
viewing time and number of repetitions were both greater
in experiment 3, long-term memory performance was
worse.
Second, separate ANOVAs for the two presentation dura-
tions with the within-subject factor number of repetitions
revealed that the difference between performance for items
presented only once and items presented more than once
was larger in experiment 1 (average difference: 21.9 %,
SE = 3.0 %), F(1, 15) = 54.9, p < .0001, η2p =
.785, than in experiment 3 (average difference: 12.2 %,
SE = 2.7 %), F(1, 15) = 21.0, p = .0004, η2p = .583,
suggesting that LTM memory consolidation was better in
experiment 1 than in experiment 3 even though total view-
ing time and number of repetitions were both greater in
experiment 3.
Discussion
Experiment 3 yielded three crucial results. First, and as in
experiments 1 and 2, long-term retention was poor or non-
existent when items were presented once, and improved
when items were presented more often. Hence, experi-
ment 3 further supports the idea that fleeting memories can
be transformed into more stable memory representations
simply by presenting items more often.
Second, both the absolute level of long-term retention
and the benefit for each additional repetition were reduced
for shorter presentation durations. These results suggest that
the stabilization of memories is graded and depends on how
strong the memory representations were in the first place.
Hence, it is possible that, with still shorter presentation
durations, no long-term retention at all might be observed.
Third, our results show that the total time during
which an item has been viewed is a poor predictor of
long-term retention, although it can be a good predictor
with somewhat longer durations or extra processing time
(e.g., Melcher, 2001). As mentioned above, long-term reten-
tion after 24 repetitions in experiment 3 was substantially
worse than long-term retention after eight repetitions in
experiment 1, although both the number of repetitions and
the total viewing durations were greater. Hence, retention
is not a monotonic function of the time during which an
item has been viewed, suggesting that there might be some
“leakage” when integrating very weak memory representa-
tions over time. These results thus further support the idea
that the benefit of each additional repetition of a stimulus
depends on the strength with which the stimulus has been
represented in the first place.
Experiment 4
In experiment 4, we further extend the results of experi-
ments 1 to 3 by asking whether similar results can be found
with verbal stimuli. As mentioned before, the objective of
this experiment was (i) to establish that intermittent repeti-
tions of verbal stimuli improve LTM retention, and (ii) to
test whether pre-existing LTM representations might impair
recognition memory.
Method
Experiment 4 was similar to experiment 2, with two excep-
tions. First, we used words rather than pictures as stimuli.
Second, stimuli were presented for a duration of 147 ms per
word, as pilot experiments revealed that this presentation
duration yielded a comparable short-term level of retention
to that of experiment 2.
Results and discussion
In the immediate memory test in the first part of exper-
iment 4, participants again performed well above chance
(M = 74.0 %, SD = 8.6 %; Fig. 4), t = 11.2, p < .0001,
Cohen’s d = 2.8. This result was similar to the part 1 results
of experiment 2. In the LTM test in the second part, partic-
ipants performed at or close to chance when the word had
been presented only once (M = 53.4 %, SD = 9.6 %; Fig. 4
and Table 1), suggesting again that a single fixation is not
sufficient for recognizing items after a retention time of a
few minutes.
When the critical items were repeated, LTM retention
gradually improved, and differed from chance performance
when items were repeated eight times. However, LTM per-
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Fig. 4 Results of experiment 4. The dotted line shows the average
percentage of correct responses during the first part of experiment 4
with an immediate test. The shaded region around it represents the
associated SEM. The solid line represents the long-term retention
performance in block 3 (average delay between the most recent pre-
sentation and the test, 3 min 9 s, SE = 7 s), the dashed line the
performance in block 2 (average delay 12 min 27 s, SE = 19 s), and
the dash-dotted line the performance in block 1 (average delay 22 min
17 s, SE = 39 s). Error bars represent SEM
formance remained substantially worse than performance in
the short-term retention task even with eight repetitions (see
Table 1).
The LTM results were analyzed using a logistic mixed-
effects model with linear predictors of block and of number
of repetitions as well as their interactions. Only the two main
effects contributed to the model likelihood. We observed a
significant main effect of the number of repetitions, β =
.029, Z = 2.41, p = .016, suggesting again that LTM reten-
tion improved when items were repeated more often. The
main effect of block did not reach significance, β = .027,
Z = .68, p = .50, ns.
The combined LTM results of experiments 2 and 4 were
analyzed using a logistic mixed-effects model with linear
predictors of experiment, block, and of number of repeti-
tions as well as their interactions. We observed significant
main effects of the number of repetitions, β = .029 Z =
2.67, p = .0075, and of block, β = .064, Z = 2.24, p =
.025. We also observed an interaction between the number
of repetitions and the experiment, β = .082 Z = 6.02, p <
.0001, suggesting that LTM performance increased more as
a function of the number of repetitions in experiment 2 than
in experiment 4.
As mentioned above, the reduced benefit of repeating
words as compared to pictures might be due to the fact that
all words were known before the experiment; hence, partic-
ipants needed to discriminate known items that have been
seen recently from known items that have not, while par-
ticipants in experiments 1 to 3 just needed to discriminate
known items from unknown items. This, in turn, might have
made the LTM retention task in experiments 1 and 2 easier.
General discussion
The present results reveal that repeatedly seeing objects for
the duration of a single fixation transforms fleeting STMs
into more stable LTM traces. After seeing an object once
for the duration of a single fixation, almost no LTM reten-
tion was observed. Further, previous research has shown
that these fleeting memories start decaying within seconds
(Endress & Potter, 2012, 2014; Intraub, 1980; Potter et al.,
2002, 2004), suggesting that they are firmly in the domain
of STM.
In contrast, after seeing an object for just eight 250-
ms durations (with each presentation separated by about
1 min and the viewing of about 60 other pictures), recog-
nition performance 30 min later was indistinguishable from
an immediate test, and in experiment 1, LTM recognition
performance exceeded an immediate memory test after 16
repetitions. However, when the presentation duration was
reduced to 133 ms per picture, LTM built up more slowly.
We suggest that repeatedly viewing objects in the envi-
ronment, even for durations of single fixations, gradually
builds up LTM representations, and allows us to recognize
the tens of thousands of objects we know. The speed of
the built-up might depend on various factors, including the
strength of the initial representation, whether or not items
are attended, and other factors. Moreover, the results of
experiment 2 show that these initial LTM representations
show some degree of loss over tens of minutes, a decline
that might plausibly continue over longer retention intervals
(Nairne, 1992). Our and previous results lend support to the
idea that there is a continuum between STM and LTM (see
Ranganath & Blumenfeld, 2005 for a recent review). In fact,
the best-accepted dissociations between LTM and STM are
that “only short-term memory [demonstrates] (1) temporal
decay and (2) chunk capacity limits” (e.g., Cowan, 2008).
However, both dissociations might need to be revised. First,
while LTM is thought to be relatively stable over time, the
current and previous results (e.g., Nairne, 1992) show that
there is still temporal decay. Second, the capacity of STM
might actually be larger than has been assumed, and the
capacity limitations traditionally attributed to STM might be
an effect of proactive interference. Specifically, Endress and
Potter (2014) presented participants with rapid sequences
of pictures or words, and showed that participants briefly
retain a certain proportion of the presented items rather
than a fixed number of items (e.g., about 30 pictures out of
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100 pictures), and that this proportion is relatively indepen-
dent of the number of presented items. The limited memory
capacity that is thought to be characteristic of STM arose
only under conditions of strong proactive interference.2
Hence, in contrast to the widely held view about differences
between STM and LTM, LTM might undergo decay, and
STM might have a large capacity. Together with the current
ones, such results thus raise the possibility that STM and
LTM might form a continuum, with short-lasting memo-
ries for brief stimuli constituting a fragile form of long-term
memory.
However, this continuum might take one of two forms.
First, STM and LTM might reflect the same psychologi-
cal construct. Second, STM and LTM representations might
be distinct but be created in parallel, with the initial stages
of LTM representations having very similar properties to
those usually attributed to STM: an LTM representation
might be generated by a brief exposure, and might be ini-
tially unstable, decaying over the course of a few seconds
or minutes.3 The relative temporal stability that is the hall-
mark of LTM items might be achieved only after repeated
or prolonged exposure. Further, the limited capacity that
is thought to be a hallmark of temporary memory sys-
tems (e.g., Cowan, 2008) might be observable only under
conditions of strong proactive interference; otherwise, tem-
porary memory might have an open-ended capacity similar
to LTM (Endress & Potter, 2014). As a result, if STM and
LTM are independent, the initial stages of LTM must have
properties that are characteristic both of LTM (e.g., a large
capacity) and of STM (e.g., availability after brief exposure;
susceptibility to decay or interference).
Be that as it might, our results suggest that brief expo-
sure to objects results in unstable LTM memory traces,
either because STM and LTM reflect the same construct,
or because the initial stages of LTM representations have
similar properties to STM representations. Once an initial
2Endress and Potter (2014) manipulated proactive interference by pre-
senting participants either with objects that would appear only in a
single trial, or by using the same set of objects throughout all tri-
als. When objects are trial-unique, proactive interference should be
minimized. In contrast, when objects from the same set of items are
used across trials, there should be interference from previous trials,
because participants would have to decide whether they have seen a
given test item in the current trial, or rather in one of the previous
trials. Accordingly, Endress and Potter (2014) found large memory
capacity estimates under low-interference conditions, while capacity
estimate remained in the range of previous working memory estimates
in the high-interference condition. Delayed recognition tests showed
that these initially remembered items began to be forgotten within
seconds, and almost all were forgotten within 30 min.
3This is not to imply that a single, brief presentation might not yield
some weak LTM trace; rather our results suggest that such traces are
generally too weak to be detect in a simple recognition paradigm.
memory trace is created, repeated but intermittent fixa-
tions of objects might be sufficient to establish a stable
representation of the objects in each of the thousands of
contexts with which we are familiar, building up a detailed
knowledge base that enables us to operate efficiently in the
complex environment we inhabit.
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